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Abstract:
We motivate and empirically analyse the idea that democratic regime change is not a dis-
crete event but a two-stage process: in the first stage, autocracies enter into an ‘episode’
of political liberalization which can last for years or even decades; in the second stage, the
ultimate outcome of the episode manifests itself and a nation undergoes regime change or
not. Failure to account for this chronology risks biased estimates of the economic effects
of democratic regime change since this ignores the relevance of the counterfactual group
in which liberalisation did not culminate in a democratic transition. Using novel Varieties
of Democracy (V-Dem) data on Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) for a large
sample of countries from 1950 to 2014 we study this phenomenon in a repeated-treatment
difference-in-difference framework which accounts for non-parallel pre-treatment trends
and selection into treatment. Our findings suggest that a single event approach signifi-
cantly underestimates the economic benefits from lasting democratic regime change.
JEL Classification: O10, P16
Keywords: Democracy, Growth, Political Development, Difference-in-Difference, Inter-
active Fixed Effects
1 Introduction
When Nelson Mandela became President of South Africa in 1994 the country had suc-
cessfully overcome Apartheid following a decades-long struggle by the African National
Congress (ANC) using first guerrilla tactics and then mass mobilisation in the form of
boycotts, strikes and demonstrations. Lifting the ban on the ANC in 1990 then-President
FW de Klerk embarked on negotiations with Mandela on behalf of the white minority to
safeguard their dominant position in South African politics but ultimately the country
adopted universal suffrage and became an electoral democracy in which De Klerk served
as Deputy President alongside Thabo Mbeki.1 The fate of the military leaders of 1980s
Brazil tells a somewhat different story of transition to democracy: boosted by the 1960s
‘miracle growth’ and with a firm grasp on the polity President Ernesto Geisel embarked
on a gradual process of political liberalisation, possibly aimed at cementing the role of
the military in an envisaged electoral autocracy. By the late 1970s, however, economic
hardship brought about by two oil crises as well as revelations of widespread corrup-
tion sparked large-scale strikes and under Geisel’s successor João Figueiredo the country
experienced mass mobilisations calling for direct elections. Since the military regime’s
leaders failed to agree on a candidate the 1985 elections were lost to the opposition, which
later in the year paved the way for legislative elections and eventually a new constitution
promulgated in 1988.2
What unites these two anecdotes is the common pattern of a drawn-out liberalisa-
tion process which eventually culminates in democratic regime change. This chronology
of events is far from uncommon: in the 62 countries in our sample (1950-2014) which
experienced democratic regime change the median length of time spent undergoing such a
liberalisation process (henceforth ‘democratisation episode’) is four years — we elaborate
below on definitions and data sources. The first contribution of this paper is to consider
democratisation as a two-stage process of episode and regime change, and to accommo-
date this chronology in the empirical analysis of the democracy-growth nexus: countries
select into democratisation episodes, and some select out of these episodes into democratic
regime change. Our approach is hence situated between those studies which favour binary
democracy indicators (e.g. Giavazzi & Tabellini 2005, Rodrik & Wacziarg 2005, Persson
& Tabellini 2006, Papaioannou & Siourounis 2008, Acemoglu et al. 2019) and those which
favour continuous measures in analysing the economic implications of democratic change
(see Bollen & Jackman, 1989, Bühlmann et al. 2008, Coppedge et al. 2011 for motivation
and Leblang 1997, Knutsen 2013, Murtin & Wacziarg 2014, and Madsen et al. 2015 for
applications).3
1We acknowledge Wilson et al. (2020) and the notes from Treisman (2020) in the narratives of our
anecdotes.
2The subsequent presidency of José Sarney ended Brazil’s military dictatorship but did little to prevent
the clientelism which was to dominate post-military politics for the foreseeable future.
3A binary indicator is deemed too insensitive, especially when examining the subtleties of hybrid
regimes and democratic or autocratic transitions (Mainwaring et al. 2007, Dahl et al. 2012). Some
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What the above anecdotes do not capture, and what is largely ignored in the ex-
isting literature on democracy and growth, is the simple insight that not all democratic
struggles end in successful regime change. Again, this happenstance is far from rare:
there are 43 countries in our dataset which experienced (at times repeated) democratic
episodes yet never became democracies. The second contribution of this paper is that
we pay close attention to comparing and contrasting alternative specifications (demo-
cratic regime change as a conventional one-stage or novel two-stage process) and, implicit
in this, alternative control groups in our investigation of the causal effect of democracy
on economic development, which can highlight the significance of our democratisation
chronology.
Our empirical approach builds on previous studies in this literature adopting difference-
in-difference specifications (e.g. Giavazzi & Tabellini 2005, Persson & Tabellini 2006, Pa-
paioannou & Siourounis 2008). Recent work on the causal analysis of treatment effects ex-
presses serious reservations about the use of the two-way fixed effects estimator within the
difference-in-difference framework when treatment effects are likely to be heterogeneous
(Athey & Imbens 2018, De Chaisemartin & d’Haultfœuille 2020).4 The novel empirical
implementation by Chan & Kwok (2020) we adopt and extend in our analysis estimates
the country-specific treatment effects and allows for non-parallel pre-treatment trends as
well as endogeneous selection into treatment. These implementations follow a very recent
tradition which introduces the insights of the panel time series literature (e.g. Bai & Ng,
2004; Pesaran, 2006; Bai, 2009; see Chudik & Pesaran, 2015, for a survey) to the empirics
of policy evaluation (e.g. Gobillon & Magnac 2016, Xu 2017). The third contribution
of this paper is to tie the empirical results closer to individual countries, and not the
average across or common estimate for all countries in the sample as is standard in much
of the literature. Length of treatment varies greatly across countries, so that a pooled
or Mean Group (Pesaran & Smith 1995) estimate would implicitly or explicitly average
across some countries which experienced decades of democracy and others which are still
only a few years past the transition period.5 Instead, using running line regressions we
show the central tendencies in estimated country treatment effects relative to the length
of time spent in democracy, while accounting for some of the difficulties in sample make-
up which naturally exist in cross-country data: the differential sample start date and the
scholars, however, have argued that the distributions of most polychotomous indices “are actually bimodal,
with a high concentration of cases in their low and high ends” (Cheibub et al. 2010, 77), thus adding
little information over and above a dichotomous classification. Others have argued that this ‘little added
information’ of a polychotomous index may be precisely what is needed for an examination of democratic
and autocratic transitions (e.g. Gates et al. 2007).
4Existing research on democracy and growth has unanimously assumed a common democracy-growth
nexus across countries, yet the same literature recognises the potential for cross-country heterogeneity as
motivated by arguments for a ‘democratic legacy’ (Gerring et al. 2005) or threshold levels in economic or
human development as necessary conditions for a positive democracy-growth nexus (Aghion et al. 2007,
Madsen et al. 2015, Acemoglu et al. 2019).
5The pooled approach further largely ignores influential outliers by failing to carry out sample reduc-
tion robustness checks, with Papaioannou & Siourounis (2008) a notable exception — see also Eberhardt
(2019) for a discussion of the robustness of the results in Acemoglu et al. (2019).
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regime change history of each country in the sample. Furthermore, by conditioning on the
frequency of democratic episodes, the years spent in episodes, and their estimated effect
on development this approach allows us to account for the two-stage nature of democratic
change we advocate.
The distinction between democratisation episode and democratic regime change is
quantified in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Episodes of Regime Transformation
(ERT) dataset (Edgell et al. 2020). Briefly, the definition of a democratisation episode
requires (i) a small positive change in an electoral democracy index (V-Dem’s polyarchy
index), and (ii) a substantial cumulative change in the same measure over the length of
the episode. An episode’s end year is demarcated by either a 5-year stasis, a substantial
single-year drop, or a cumulative drop over a number of years.6 Democratic regime change
is based on the V-Dem Regimes of the World (ROW) indicator for democracy but further
requires a ‘founding election’ to take place — this assumes that simply abolishing an
autocratic regime is not sufficient to constitute a democracy. Using these definitions
our dataset from 1950 to 2014 contains 238 democratisation episodes and 79 democratic
regime changes, taking place in 114 countries (of which 71 experienced regime change and
43 did not).7
Our implementation adopts the Principal Component Difference-in-Difference (PC-
DID) estimator of Chan & Kwok (2020) which augments the country-specific equation in
each treated country with common factors estimated from the control group sample of
never-treated ones. This framework allows for a great deal of flexibility in terms of dif-
ferential pre-treatment trends between treated and control samples as well as correlation
between the additional covariates, common factors and the treatment variable (i.e. se-
lection into treatment). The implementation just described applies to democracy as a
single-stage process (henceforth Single PCDID) — we extend the approach to a two-
stage/repeated-treatment Difference-in-Difference estimator (henceforth Double PCDID)
for all countries which experienced both democratic episodes and regime change (separate
treatment dummies) and augment the country-specific estimation equation with common
factors extracted from the two respective control groups: (i) countries which never expe-
rienced a democratisation episode, and (ii) countries which experienced an episode but
not regime change.
We find that failing to account for episodes and selection into regime change by
adopting the appropriate counterfactual groups substantially underestimates the economic
benefits of democratisation: first, positive economic effects emerge substantially earlier in
6ERT also considers episodes within regimes which are already democratic, which are ignored in
our analysis: we focus exclusively on political liberalisation in autocracies which do or do not result in
democratic regime change.
7We cannot use all 71 countries with successful regime change in our analysis since 9 of them have
no pre-episodal observations which prevents separate identification of episode and regime change effects;
hence, our treated sample comprises 62 countries experiencing 70 regime changes and 141 episodes. The
43 control group countries experienced 86 episodes, the median rate of 2 episodes per country is identical
across these two samples.
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our Double PCDID results than in a standard model considering only regime change and
ignoring the significance of countries with failed episodes as a relevant control group (Sin-
gle PCDID); and second, the magnitude of these economic benefits from democratisation
substantially diverge in that they continue to accrue with increasing number of years in
democracy in our preferred Double PCDID model but plateau fairly soon after a small
burst at around 25 years in the Single PCDID model.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: in the next section we discuss
the conceptual foundations of political regime change as a non-binary event, introduce
the data sources and present descriptive analysis of the patterns of democratic episodes
and regime change over the sample period. Section 3 covers the common factor model
setup and the empirical implementations in greater detail. Main results and robustness
checks are presented in Section 4, Section 5 concludes.
2 Regime Change as a Two-Stage Process
In this section we provide a conceptual motivation for democratisation as a two-stage
process. We then introduce the V-Dem ERT dataset and offer some descriptive analysis.
2.1 Conceptual Development
Our empirical implementation captures two important elements of democratisation which
we seek to motivate in the following: first, a framework for the initiation and completion of
democratic liberalisation and regime change with a particular focus on time (the rationale
for ‘episodes’); and second, a concern over those nations which initiated a process of sub-
stantive liberalisation but were unable or unwilling to translate this into democratic regime
change (the rationale for an appropriate counterfactual to democratic regime change).8
Empirical studies of democratisation are commonly focused on the analysis of elec-
toral autocracies, so-called ‘hybrid regimes’, which have occupied the political science
literature for at least the past two decades (Diamond 2002, Brownlee 2009, Levitsky &
Way 2010, Donno 2013, Geddes et al. 2014). These authors would appear to (tacitly)
agree that democratisation is an event, a single moment of “dramatic upheaval” (Gunit-
sky 2014, 561) in the fashion of Huntington’s (1991) ‘democratic waves’, and they merely
disagree in the set of prescribed criteria required or the determining factors present for a
nation to drag itself over the ‘democracy’ finishing line. This concept of ‘transitions as
events’ (Wilson et al. 2020) is in stark contrast to the ‘gradualist path’ to stable electoral
democracy envisaged by Robert Dahl (1971) which so fittingly described the Latin Ameri-
can experience during the 19th and early 20th centuries (Diamond et al. 1989). According
to Diamond (2002, 167) “this gradualist path has been closed off” in the “contemporary
8We do not seek to explain the onset of a democratic episode and/or its ultimate outcome; however,
we assume that neither can be seen as exogenous and hence we must account for selection into episodes
and regime change in our empirical implementation.
4
world of mass participation”. Yet, this hardly justifies entirely ignoring the significance
of time in the process of liberalisation and regime change. Democratic transitions are
the result of a (potentially lengthy) process of political struggle between several actors
(Rustow 1970, Acemoglu & Robinson 2006). Many formal models of nondemocratic pol-
itics can be argued to speak to this notion of the passing of time (Gehlbach et al. 2016):
Liberalisation represents a period of uncertainty over the political trajectory of a coun-
try due to mass mobilisation or coalition formation (or its failure). ‘Cascading’ protests
and revolutionary movements may take time to foment regime-busting power in the face
of repression. Alternatively, successive ‘colour revolutions’ over time may reveal to the
opposition that the governing regime is not the problem or obstacle to regime change.
Existing research in the comparative case study literature provides a self-preserving ra-
tionale for autocracies to engage in liberalisation (Magaloni 2008, Levitsky & Way 2010,
Frantz & Kendall-Taylor 2014), although they might end up as democracies ‘by mistake’
(Treisman 2020). Hence, while revolutions and other events of dramatic upheaval leading
to democratic regime change undoubtedly do occur, these arguments would suggest that
establishing the political institutions of democracy, in all their multifaceted complexity,
frequently does not happen over night.
Recent work by Geddes et al. (2014) and an earlier tradition (e.g. O’Donnell &
Schmitter 1986, Hadenius & Teorell 2007) highlights the relative ignorance in the empirical
literature towards democratisation events which did not result in regime change, i.e. when
autocratic regimes survive leadership challenges or are replaced by new autocratic regimes.
Levitsky & Way (2010, 52) point to the record of democratic transition in hybrid regimes
during the 1990s which makes “the unidirectional implications of the word ‘transitional’
misleading". The very presence of hybrid regimes and the uncertainty over their ‘direction
of travel’ creates awkward questions for the empirical literature on the democracy-growth
nexus employing binary representations of democratic regime change (e.g. Giavazzi &
Tabellini 2005, Papaioannou & Siourounis 2008, Acemoglu et al. 2019): this practice
requires that within-category subjects are homogeneous (Wilson et al. 2020) and hence
all ‘negative’ cases of transition are lumped together.9 It is a well-known empirical fact
that the variation in growth outcomes is substantially higher among autocratic regimes,
i.e. some autocracies have very high and others very poor growth outcomes (Persson &
Tabellini 2009, Knutsen 2012). For the latter group, democracy can act as a ‘safety net’
against disastrous economic outcomes (Knutsen 2020) and hence they may attempt to
undergo a process of liberalisation, while in the former an autocracy can perhaps ‘grow
itself’ out of any demands for political liberalisation, like China arguably has done for the
past three decades.
What is the appropriate control group when studying the economic implications
of democratic regime change? Modelling regime change as a two-stage process identifies
9In a separate literature which adopts continuous measures for democracy (e.g. Knutsen 2013, Murtin
& Wacziarg 2014, Madsen et al. 2015) failed liberalisations remain similarly undistinguished.
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clear ‘treated’ and ‘control’ groups, whereby first some autocracies select into liberalisa-
tion, whereas others (the first control group) do not; and subsequently, some liberalising
autocracies select into regime change, whereas others (the second control group) do not.
By failing to distinguish between those nations which attempted liberalisation and those
that did not, conventional operationalisations capturing ‘democratic transitions-as-events’
ignore the endogenous selection into liberalisation, as well as the identity of the relevant
counterfactual case for successful regime change. Both these omissions are likely to induce
bias in the empirical estimates of the ‘treatment effect’ of democratic regime change.
2.2 Data Sources, Variable Transformations
We use democracy data from the V-Dem Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT)
dataset (Edgell et al. 2020), real per capita GDP and population from Bolt et al. (2018,
the updated ‘Maddison data’), and exports and imports from Fouquin & Hugot (2016,
TRADHIST). For comparison we also employ the democracy data from Marshall et al.
(2017, PolityIV), where a positive polity2 variable indicates democracy,10 and from V-
Dem’s Regimes of the World (Lührmann et al. 2018, ROW).11
In line with the practice in Acemoglu et al. (2019) we log-transform real per capita
GDP and multiply this by 100: results from our difference-in-difference models hence
produce estimates of the percentage change in income as a result of regime change. We
compute the population growth rate and add this as a covariate to the model together
with the export/trade ratio, constructed by aggregating TRADHIST bilateral export
and import flows at the country-year level. Population growth as covariate is justified
by the use of per capita GDP as dependent variable,12 while controlling for trade was
found to have significant impact on the estimated magnitude of the democracy effect
(e.g. Papaioannou & Siourounis 2008, Table 3 [5]; Acemoglu et al. 2019, Table 6 [6]).
We adopt the democratic regime transformation dummy from ERT (reg type)
alongside the democratisation episode dummy (dem ep). An episode requires a (i) small
increase (0.01) in the V-Dem polyarchy index13 for a country classified as ‘closed’ or
‘electoral democracy’ following the V-Dem ROW grouping (Lührmann et al. 2018); and
(ii) a total increase of at least 0.1 in the same measure over the course of the episode. Since
autocracies have low index levels this cumulative growth amounts to a very substantial
proportional increase.14 An episode ends after a year with an increase of at least 0.01
if this is followed by a year-on-year drop of 0.03, a cumulative drop of 0.1 over several
10While a ‘democracy-threshold’ of polity2≥ 6 would achieve higher concept-measurement validity, it
would make our results incomparable to previous studies (e.g. Persson & Tabellini 2006, Madsen et al.
2015, Acemoglu et al. 2019). We therefore adopt a democracy-threshold of polity2> 0.
11The ROW is available as part of Coppedge et al. (2019).
12Population levels are likely integrated of order 2.
13This increment may seem small, 1% of the range of the entire index, yet between 1900 and 2018 over
70% of annual increments in the polyarchy index are between -0.01 and 0.01 (Wilson et al. 2020).
14However, no democratisation episode can leave a country in the ROW ‘closed autocracy’ category,
since this would not constitute substantive change.
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Year
ERT Democratisation Episode [years] Guatemala [17] Gabon [11]
PolityIV Democratic Regime Change
Notes: We present the V-Dem polyarchy index evolution for country pairs, where the country in dark
pink experienced regime change and the country in light blue did not. The period highlighted by the
thick line represents the democratisation episode, following ERT (the length of each episodes in years
in indicated in the legend). The ‘Eastern’ end of the thick pink lines always coincides with the year
of democratic regime change. A dashed (solid) thin line indicates the country regime is in autocracy
(democracy) following the ERT definition. For reference we add a marker for the year in which the
PolityIV polity2 index for the country turns positive. Note that for South Africa this index is positive
throughout(!) the sample period. The two plots in the bottom panel highlight that many countries
experienced multiple democratisation episodes.
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years, or a 5-year stasis. The democratic regime change dummy builds on the ROW
categorisation of democracy but further requires a founding democratic election to occur.
If democratic institutions keep improving, then in the standard ERT definition
the episode dummy extends into periods when regime change has already taken place
(‘democratic deepening’ — see middle panel of Figure 2). In order to obtain separate
treatment effect estimates for episodes and regime changes we therefore adopt the subtype
indicator for a ‘liberalizing autocracy’: our episode dummy always reverts from a 1 to a
0 in the first year of democracy.
All variables are available from 1901 to 2014, but here we limit our analysis to the
1950-2014 period: our methodology, which relies on common factors extracted from two
sets of control groups, would not yield reliable results for the longer panel since only a
handful of countries in the respective control groups have observations in the first half of
the 20th century.15 Our empirical approach forces us to consider the relative sample sizes
of treated and various control groups, which we believe is a strength rather than a weak-
ness of this implementation. Our 1950-2014 sample covers 62 ‘treated’ countries which
experienced episodes and regime change (n=3,724 observations), 43 autocratic countries
which only experienced democratisation episodes (n=2,515; control group 2), and 15 au-
tocratic countries which never experienced episodes (n=646; control group 1).
2.3 Descriptive Analysis: Democratic Episodes and Regime Change
Figure 1 charts the development of electoral democracy (V-Dem’s polyarchy index, the ba-
sis for the episodes data) in six country pairs which experienced democratisation episodes
(thick lines) but with differential outcomes (democratic regime change, solid thin line, or
not, dashed thin line). Country pairs typically started out with near-identical polyarchy
scores in the 1950s, but at times ended up at opposite ends of the scale in 2015. For
reference we add to these plots the first year of democracy as defined by a positive polity2
score (PolityIV).
Figure 2 provides an overview of the distribution of democratic episodes and regime
changes in our sample. In the top panel the histogram in light blue for the episodes
highlights two peaks in the late 1950s/early 1960s, and in the 1990s, coinciding with the
second and third waves of democracy (Huntington 1993). The lowest rate of ongoing
democratisation episodes is in the mid-1960s and 1970s, with at times fewer than 20
countries experiencing an episode at any one time. The regime change events, in dark
pink, clearly match these patterns for the second peak in the 1990s, but to a lesser
extent for the early sample period in the 1950s and 1960s. The middle panel supports
this notion of differential rates of episodes and episode outcomes over time: the share of
episodes which did not lead to democratic transition (in pink) is particularly strong in the
15For countries which never experienced a democratisation episode we have 48 observations for Taiwan
and China (NC = 2) prior to 1950. For countries which experienced episodes but not regime change we
have 83 observations from Malaysia, Haiti and Cuba (NC = 3) for the same time period.
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Episodes Evolution (lower panel) and Average Length in Years (centred MA(5), upper panel) Failed Successful
Notes: We present the distribution of democratisation episodes and regime changes in the top panel, the
share of episode type in the middle panel, and the individual evolution of each episode in the lower plot
along with the smoothed annual mean episode length (computed for episode start years) in the bottom
panel.
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1950s and early 1960s, and again in the 1990s. Episodes culminating in regime change (in
yellow) are only substantial in the late 1970s to early 1990s and are otherwise dominated
by the former group.
The median episode length in treated countries is four years (stdev. 3.3), and six
years (stdev. 3.4) in countries where episodes did not lead to regime change; in either
group there were a median of two episodes per country (stdev. 1.1) — the bottom panel
in Figure 2 charts the mean episode length over time and the evolution of each episode
in our sample. The graphs for successful episodes are frequently very steep and hence of
short duration, yet it would be misleading to claim that these trajectories dominate the
treatment sample — see also the detailed analysis in Appendix A.
3 Empirical Strategies
In this section we introduce the two novel empirical implementations we employ to study
the economic effect of democratisation when regime change is modelled as either a single
or a repeated ‘treatment’. We discuss the Principal Component Difference-in-Difference
estimator by Chan & Kwok (2020, ‘Single’ PCDID) and subsequently our extension, the
‘Double’ PCDID, for these respective cases. The final part of this section introduces
our novel visual presentation of heterogeneous treatment effects using predictions from
running line regressions.
3.1 Single Treatment PCDID
Setup Using potential outcomes, the observed outcome of a single treatment Dit for
panel unit i at time T0 can be written as
yit = Dityit(0) + (1−Dit)yit(1) = ∆it1{i∈E}1{t>T0} + yit(0) (1)
with yit(0) = ςi + β′ixit + µ
′
ift + ε̃it, (2)
where the first and second indicator variables 1{·} are for the panel unit and the time
period treated, respectively, ∆it is the time-varying heterogeneous treatment effect, x
is a vector of observed covariates with associated country-specific parameters βi,16 µ′ift
represents a set of unobserved common factors ft with country-specific factor loadings µi,
and ε̃it is the error term.
The treatment effect is assumed to decompose into ∆it = ∆i + ∆̃it, with E(∆̃it|t >
T0) = 0 ∀i ∈ E since ∆̃it is the demeaned, time-varying idiosyncratic component of ∆it;
we refer to ∆i as ITET, the treatment effect of unit i averaged over the post-intervention
16We assume βi = β̄ + β̃i where E(β̃i) = 0 as is common in the literature (e.g. Pesaran 2006). Note
that covariates x and factors f can be orthogonal or correlated (factor overlap).
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period — this is our key parameter of interest. The reduced form model is then




ift + εit with εit = ε̃it + ∆̃it1{i∈E}1{t>T0}, (3)
where given the treatment effect decomposition the composite error εit has zero mean but
can be heteroskedastic and/or weakly dependent (e.g. spatial or temporal correlation).
The factor structure has a long tradition in the panel time series literature to cap-
ture strong cross-section dependence (e.g. Pesaran 2006, Bai 2009), a form of unobserved,
time-varying heterogeneity.17 Strong correlation across panel members is distinct from
weaker forms of dependence, such as spatial correlation, and if ignored can lead to serious
(omitted variable) bias in the estimated coefficients on observable variables (Phillips &
Sul 2003, Andrews 2005). Here, the combination of common factors and heterogeneous
parameters also allows for potentially non-parallel trends across panel units, most im-
portantly between treated and control units. The above setup can further accommodate
endogeneity of treatment Dit in the form of inter alia correlation between treated units
and factor loadings, the timing of treatment and factor loadings, or between observed
covariates and timing or units of treatment. Finally, the implementation allows for non-
stationary factors f .
Intuition and Assumptions The basic intuition for Chan & Kwok’s (2020) PCDID
estimator follows that of the control function approach in microeconometric analysis of
production functions (Olley & Pakes 1996, Levinsohn & Petrin 2003) with factors taking
on the role of the control functions: common factors are estimated from the control sample
via Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and added to the country-specific estimation
equation for the treated units as additional covariates. The main assumptions required
for the consistency of ITET estimates are that the unobservables can be represented by
a multi-factor error structure, µ′ift (‘interactive effects’), as in Athey et al. (2018) and
the panel time series literature cited above, and that ε is orthogonal to all conditioning
components in equation (4): all aspects of treatment endogeneity and nonparallel trends
are assumed to be captured by the factor structure, the controls, and the deterministic
term as well as their combinations/correlation with the treatment variable.18 Since factor
proxies are measured with error, the idiosyncratic errors ε̃it of treated and non-treated
units may be correlated — this asymptotic bias is removed with a condition that asymp-
totically
√
T/NC → 0, where T is the time series dimension of the treated sample and
NC is the number of units in the control sample.
Application to the Democracy-Growth Nexus The ‘single treatment’ case is sim-
ply an endogenous selection into democratic regime change where pre-treatment trends
17Eberhardt & Teal (2011) provide a detailed introduction to these models with discussion of empirical
applications from the cross-country growth literature.
18Correlation between ∆i and x relaxes the stricter assumptions in Gobillon & Magnac (2016).
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between treated and non-treated (never-regime changing) countries are potentially non-
parallel. Our setup captures the possibility of a correlation between time-varying observed
as well as unobserved determinants of economic development (absorptive capacity, insti-
tutions, culture, etc) and democratic regime change and hence of selection into treatment.
The treatment is defined by some binary variable, such as a positive value in the polity2
variable of PolityIV, the V-Dem ROW categorisation of democracy, or the V-Dem ERT
categorisation of democracy (regime change). The control group is the set of countries
which remained autocratic throughout the sample period.
Implementation The estimation of the country-specific treatment effect (ITET) ∆i
proceeds in two steps: first, using PCA, we estimate proxies of the unobserved common
factors from data in the control group equation; second, country-specific least squares
regressions of treatment group countries are augmented with these factor proxies as ad-
ditional covariates.
The estimation equation for treated country i ∈ E is then:




1ixit + uit, (4)
where f̂ are the estimated factors obtained by PCA of the residuals ê from the hetero-
geneous regression of yit = b0i + b′1ixit + eit in the control group sample, and δi is the
country-specific parameter of interest (regime change). We estimate (4) augmented with
one to six common factors. See Section 3.3 for inference.
3.2 Repeated-Treatment PCDID















′fA Bt + ε̃it.
We now distinguish two treatments: A for the treatment at some point T0 and B
for a second treatment at some later point T1 > T0, yet conditional on having received
treatment A. The overall treatment group is now made up of those panel units which
experienced both treatments (i ∈ E∗). Along with two treatments there are now two
control groups: (1) all those units which never experienced treatment A, and (2) those
units which experienced treatment A but not treatment B (see ‘Implementation’ below
for notation). The setup can be thought of as a double-selection process where selected
and ‘discarded’ units are possibly on different trajectories and selection itself may be
correlated with observables and/or unobservables; or as a repeated-threshold regression
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model where treated units are those which overcome both thresholds.19 We now assume
two sets of multi-factor error terms: one for each counterfactual group, respectively. The
reduced form is now
yit = ∆
A











′fA Bt + εit
using similar arguments as in the single intervention case.
Intuition The two sets of common factors account for non-parallel trends prior to the
two treatments, and in analogy to the single treatment case in the PCDID these unob-
served common factors can be correlated with treatments or observed covariates. Correct-
ing for repeated treatment/selection requires the use of estimated common factors from
two distinct control groups.
Application to the Democracy-Growth Nexus The ‘repeated-treatment’ case ar-
gues for democratic regime change as a repeated selection problem: (i) At a point in time
T0 an autocratic country sets out on a path towards democratic liberalisation, i.e. it en-
dogenously selects into a ‘democratisation episode’ as defined by ERT. The control group
for this first treatment are all autocratic countries which never experienced a democratic
episode. Not only is the selection into episodes assumed endogenous, but we can fur-
ther allow for non-parallel pre-treatment trends. (ii) Of those autocratic countries which
did experience an episode of democratisation we find two types: first, those which suc-
cessfully transitioned into democracy, and second, those which failed. From the pool of
autocracies which experienced a democratic episode we thus have a country which at a
point in time T1 endogenously selects into ‘democratic regime change’ as defined by ERT.
The control group for this second treatment constitutes all autocratic countries with at
least one episode but which never transitioned into democracy. Again, we assume that
the pre-treatment trends (i.e. during the democratic episode) are potentially non-parallel
between these two groups. Most importantly, this approach postulates that the most
relevant control group for countries successfully transitioning into democracy are not all
those countries which never experienced regime change, but a strict subset of the latter
which engaged in democratisation episodes: those that tried and failed, rather than a
combination of those that tried and failed and those that never tried.
Implementation The estimation of the ITET ∆i again proceeds in two steps: first,
using PCA, we separately estimate proxies of the unobserved common factors in the
two control groups; second, country-specific least squares regressions of treatment group
19Naturally, the methodology can be extended to cover the analysis of many thresholds/selection pro-
cesses/treatments, provided that respective control samples are available and sufficiently large.
13
countries are augmented with the two sets of factor proxies as additional covariates. The
estimation equation for treated country i ∈ E∗ is














′f̂A Bt + b
′
1ixit + eit, (7)
where the f̂ with the superscript A (A B) are the estimated factors obtained by PCA from
the residuals ê of a heterogeneous regression of yit = b0i + b′1ixit + eit in the first (second)
control group sample, and δAi and δBi are the country-specific treatment parameters for
episodes and regime change (ITET). We estimate (7) with one to six common factors
extracted from each control group, respectively. See Section 3.3 for inference.
Treatment and Control Groups In an appendix we list the country makeup and
further details of the three relevant samples for our analysis: (i) the first control group
of autocratic countries which never experienced a democratisation episode (N=15 coun-
tries); prominent group members include China, Viet Nam, and a number of (oil-rich)
Middle Eastern and Central Asian economies; (ii) the second control group of countries
which remained autocratic throughout the sample period but experienced democratisa-
tion episodes (N=43 countries); many of these countries are in Africa and on average
around 20% (st.dev. 14%) of their observations are in episodes; and (iii) the treated sam-
ple of countries which experienced democratisation episodes and regime change (N=62
countries). These spend on average 16% (st.dev. 9%) of their observations in episodes,
38% (22%) in democracy and 46% (19%) in autocracy.20
3.3 Presentation of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects and Infer-
ence
Given the decomposition of the treatment effect ∆it a typically useful estimate would be
the ATET, which in our setup would be ∆ = E(∆i), the average of the ITET across
treated units i ∈ E or E∗. This makes sense in the context of a level effect of treatment
which manifests itself after a small number of years, as one would expect in the context
of many medical interventions. In the context of the democracy-growth nexus we instead
argue for an alternative means of presentation, namely conditional running line plots of the
estimated ITET for democratic regime change, δ̂Bi , in relation to the years of treatment.
This has the following advantages: (i) we do not average across different countries with
dozens or just a handful of years in democracy; (ii) we can account for differential sample
observations (e.g. different start years in the sample); (iii) we can account for multiple
regime changes within a country;21 (iv) we can condition on the novel two-stage setup
20These numbers refer to the estimation sample: for an additional 9 countries we have no pre-episode
observations in autocracy, hence we cannot separately estimate the episode and regime change effect.
21To the best of our knowledge any study in the existing literature on democracy and growth models
democratisation as a one-off event, ignoring the empirical reality that some countries flip back and forth
between regimes.
14
advocated here, by conditioning on the number of democratisation episodes, the years
spent in these episodes, and the magnitude of the episode effect δ̂Ai , and (v) we do not a
priori impose the restriction that democracy only has a one-off levels effect on income as
implied by an ATET approach.22
A running line regression smooths the dependent variable (here the estimated regime
change effect: δ̂Bi ) against the independent variable (here the time spent in democracy)
by using subsets of nearest neighbours in local linear regressions. In our presentation we
can rely on simultaneous smoothing on multiple independent variables: hence we are able
to add additional controls into this flexible running line regression to address the sample
concerns as well as the idiosyncracies of countries’ democratic histories with regard to
episodes and regime changes.
Since in analogy to a standard Mean Group estimator the regular ATET in the
Chan & Kwok (2020) PCDID is simply the average across all treated units i, with a non-
parametric variance estimator following Pesaran (2006), we adopt running line regressions
as ‘local ATET’, where ‘local’ refers to a similar number of years spent in democracy, and
the standard errors from this methodology.23
4 Empirical Results
Benchmark results Figure 3 presents the results from Single PCDID models for three
democracy indicators: a dummy for a positive polity2 score (PolityIV), a dummy for
the V-Dem ROW categorisation (ROW≥2), and the ERT regime type dummy. In all
cases the democracy effect (in percent, y-axis) is smoothed over the years the country
spent in democracy (x-axis) using multiple running line regression. Here, and in all other
results graphs below, we further control for (i) the start year of the country series, and (ii)
the number of times a country moved into or out of democracy. Filled (white) markers
indicate statistically (in)significance at the 10% level. Panel (a) reports the full results,
in panel (b) we focus on the first 25 years in democracy.24
The treatment effects and their relationship with length of time spent in democ-
racy are largely identical across results for these three democratic regime type indicators:
effects are moderately positive and statistically insignificant for the first 25 years, where-
upon additional years spent in democracy are associated with a rise in income up until
around 40 years of ‘treatment’, which is associated with a 12-14% higher per capita GDP.
Thereafter the effect plateaus.
22Existing work by Papaioannou & Siourounis (2008) concludes an annual growth effect of around 1%,
whereas the work by Acemoglu et al. (2019) points more to a levels effect, albeit at 20-30% over 25 years,
a very substantial one.
23Since these standard errors do not account in full for the correlation among all the regressors we
employ bootstrap methods with 1,000 replications to show that using bias-corrected confidence intervals
the patterns of statistical significance are very similar to those in the uncorrected results — see Appendix
for detailed presentation.
24The sample size is limited to the 62 ‘treated’ countries in the Double PCDID analysis below.
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(b) Snapshot of the first 25 Years in Democracy
Notes: The plots in Panels (a) and (b) present the results from running line regressions of country-
specific democracy coefficients, derived from Single PCDID estimates, on the years spent in democracy.
All regressions further condition on the start year of the country series and the number of democratisations
and reversals a country experienced. All results can be interpreted as local ATET, where local refers
to the number of years spent in democracy. A solid (white) marker indicates statistically (in)significant
difference from zero at the 10% level. The underlying PCDID estimates are for the positive polity2
variable (PolityIV), the V-Dem Regimes of the World definition of democracy (ROW2), and the V-
Dem ERT dummy. Full results and an enlargement of the first 25 years are presented in (a) and (b),
respectively. All results in these plots are for PCDID models augmented with 4 common factors. The
sample is adjusted to be equal to that of the Double PCDID estimates for ERT presented in Figure 4.
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Accounting for democratic episodes In Figure 4 we combine results from Single
PCDID models with those from the Double PCDID. In the upper plot of panel (a) the
orange and yellow lines are the running line estimates for the effect of democracy based
on the PolityIV and the ERT definition of democracy using a Single PCDID model —
these are the same as the results in Figure 3. The pink line presents the running line
estimate for the ERT definition of democratic regime change in a Double PCDID model,
while the blue line presents the result for the same definition of democracy but here the
running line regression further accounts for country information on (i) the number of
democratic episodes, (ii) the years spent in democratic episodes, and (iii) the coefficient
estimate on the episodes dummy, δ̂Bi . The blue line hence is the preferred specification
since it accounts for the double-selection process inherent in democratic regime change.
The lower plot in the same panel zooms into the first 25 years of the same relationship.
Comparing the blue and orange lines in these two plots it is obvious that the ERT
definition of democracy implies a much more substantial long-run effect on development if
we account for democratic episodes: in the early years of democracy this yields a statisti-
cally significant positive effect from around 12 years onwards (economic magnitude around
10% higher per capita GDP), rising almost linearly for further years spent in democracy
and reaching around 30% higher per capita GDP after 50 years in democracy. In contrast,
as established above, the Single PCDID estimates indicate a mostly insignificant effect
of democracy up to almost 25 years and a flattening out beyond that at a maximum of
12-14% higher per capita GDP.
Robustness All of the above estimates are constructed from PCDID models where we
include four common factors estimated from the covariates in the control group(s) to ac-
count for non-parallel trends and selection.25 In panel (b) of Figure 4 we show the ERT
estimate for the augmentation with four common factors in blue alongside alternative
specifications with 1 to 6 common factors (i.e. 2 to 12 since this is the Double PCDID
specification) — these running line estimates all account for episodes of democratisation.
With only one or two common factors the estimate for the democracy-growth nexus is
attenuated but still reaches 20% higher per capita GDP. Including three or more com-
mon factors leads to qualitatively identical results. This outcome is not surprising since
research by Moon and Weidner (2015) suggests that including more common factors than
necessary does not bias the results for the parameter of interest.
In additional robustness checks we explore the empirical reality that even countries
which successfully transitioned to democracy often needed several attempts (episodes):
only 25 of the 62 treated countries had a single democratisation episode, 21 had two, and
16 between three and five. We demonstrate that the strong positive effect in our main
results in Figure 4 is mostly driven by countries which experienced one or two democrati-
25In the Double PCDID this means four factors constructed from the control group which ‘never
experienced an episode’ and a further four factors constructed from the control group which ‘experienced
democratisation episodes but never experienced regime change’.
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(b) Alternative Factor Augmentations: Conditional ERT
Notes: The plots in Panel (a) present the results from running line regressions of country-specific democ-
racy coefficients, derived from Single or Double PCDID estimates, on years spent in democracy. All
regressions further condition on the start year of the country series and the number of regime changes a
country experienced. A solid (white) marker indicates statistically (in)significant difference from zero at
the 10% level. The Single PCDID estimates are for the positive polity2 variable (PolityIV) and the V-Dem
ERT dummy – these are the same as presented in Figure 3 above. The Double PCDID estimates control
for selection into a democratisation episode and separately into democratic regime change. We present
the estimates for the ERT dummy, with the running line model labelled ‘Cond. ERT’ further conditioning
on the country estimates for a democratic episode (δ̂Bi ), the years spent in democratic episodes, and the
number of democratic episodes. Full results and an enlargement of the first 25 years are presented. All
results in these plots are for PCDID models augmented with 4 common factors (hence 8 in the Double
PCDID); in Panel (b) we report Cond. ERT results from Double PCDID models augmented with 1 to 6
factors (2-12). 18
sation episodes. Nevertheless, the divergence between Single and Double PCDID results
remains in all groups (see Appendix Figure B-2).
Furthermore, the above results employ a model with additional covariates. We
demonstrate that a ‘plain vanilla’ version of the Single and Double PCDID excluding
these produces identical relative patterns in running line regressions (Appendix Figures
B-3 and B-4).
We know from our descriptive analysis of democratisation episodes and regime
change that these events are not uniformly distributed over time, so we explore alternative
start (1950-1970) and end years (1995-2014) for robustness. The significant deviation
between the economic effects of modelling a simple model and our two-stage model of
regime change remains, regardless of the start year or end year adopted in our robustness
exercise (see Appendix Figures B-5 and B-6).
Finally, we estimate a Single PCDID model for all countries which experienced
regime change (defined by ERT) but use the group of countries which experienced episodes
but no regime change as control group to construct the factors — this model hence only
differs from the Single PCDID of the ERT dummy (the orange line estimates in Figures 3
and 4) by the choice of counterfactual/control group: in the ‘benchmark’ model these are
all 58 countries which never experienced regime change as defined by V-Dem’s ERT, in the
robustness check this covers only a subset of 43 countries which never experienced regime
change but did experience democratic episodes. The running line plots for these two alter-
native models show substantial deviation (see Appendix Figure B-7): the counterfactual
clearly matters.
5 Conclusion
This paper speaks to recent efforts in the analysis of the democracy-growth nexus which
emphasise that greater care needs to be taken in defining democratic regime change events
(Papaioannou & Siourounis 2008, Acemoglu et al. 2019). In contrast to these studies
which employ binary regime change indicators we motivate and empirically implement
regime change as a two-stage process, made up of a liberalisation episode and regime
change. Our main concern is the selection bias implicit in existing studies which model
democratisation as a single event. Instead, we propose an alternative approach which uses
all those countries which embarked on an ultimately unsuccessful liberalisation episode as
a counterfactual to the group of countries which became democracies. We do so adopt-
ing a repeated-treatment Difference-in-Difference estimator adapted from Chan & Kwok
(2020) which allows for heterogeneous treatment effects, and compare the outcomes using
the implementation which assumes a single treatment. Focusing on the distributional fea-
tures of the individual treatment effects, our findings suggest that ignoring the two-stage
nature of democratisation and hence adopting the wrong control sample substantially
underestimates the economic effect of democracy on economic development.
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Returning to our main results in the top panel of Figure 4, the deviation between
Single and Double PCDID results could potentially suggest a very different effect of
democracy, depending on whether regime change is modelled as a single or two-stage
process: the clearly concave nature of the orange Single PCDID results implies that shift-
ing from autocracy to democracy creates a one-off levels effect of around 12-14% higher
income per capita; the petering out of any growth effect is apparent from around 30 years
in democracy onwards. In contrast, the Double PCDID results in blue hint at a much
more linear relationship, which would imply that democracy can exert a perpetual growth
effect on per capita income.
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Appendix — Not Intended For Publication
A Data Appendix
We provide detailed information of the makeup of three samples: in Table A-3 we study
the ‘treated’ sample, the countries which experienced democratic episodes and demo-
cratic regime change. In Table A-2 we report details on the countries which experienced
democratic episodes but never realised regime change, while Table A-1 covers all those
countries which remained autocracies throughout their sample period and never had any
democratic episodes.
Our choice of data sources (Maddison, TRADHIST) enables analysis from 1950-
2014, but excludes a number of countries which are available in ERT from inclusion in
the treatment or control groups: ten small treated economies (Bhutan, Fiji, Guyana,
Kosovo, Maldives, PNG, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Timor-Leste, Vanuatu); five small
(historical) economies with failed episodes: Zanzibar, Somaliland, Somalia, Republic of
(South) Vietnam, GDR; and three autocratic economies with no episodes: South Yemen,
Gaza/Palestine, Eritrea.
Our 1950-2014 sample covers 62 ‘treated’ countries which experienced episodes and
regime change (n=3,724 observations), 43 autocratic countries which only experienced
democratisation episodes (n=2,515; control group 2), and 15 autocratic countries which
never experienced episodes (n=646; control group 1). Four democracies reverted to autoc-
racy and subsequently had unsuccessful democratisation episodes (n=75 observations); 9
countries had episodes and regime change but no pre-episode data (n=399) — both sets
of observations are excluded from the analysis. The balance to arrive at 161 countries in
the full available sample (n=8,770) is made up by 28 countries which were democracies
throughout the sample period, which are also excluded. In practice the minimum number
of time series observations for inclusion in our analysis is n = 21. This is in line with
the practice in Giavazzi & Tabellini (2005), Persson & Tabellini (2006) and Papaioannou
& Siourounis (2008). Note that Eberhardt (2019) demonstrates the fragility of results in
Acemoglu et al. (2019) when countries with ‘small N’ are excluded from analysis, high-
lighting the overall lack of robustness in these authors’ findings.
(i)
Table A-1: Sample Makeup: Control Group 1 (never experienced a democratisation episode)
Country ISO Total Country ISO Total
obs obs
United Arab Emirates ARE 21 North Korea PRK 35
Azerbaijan AZE 21 Qatar QAT 40
China CHN 64 Saudi Arabia SAU 64
Cuba CUB 65 Tajikistan TJK 21
Djibouti DJI 64 Turkmenistan TKM 21
Iran IRN 64 Uzbekistan UZB 21
Kazakhstan KAZ 21 Viet Nam VNM 60
Mozambique MOZ 64
Notes: This table provides details on the sample-makeup of the first control group sample, made up of
the 15 countries which never experienced a democratic episode (and of course also no regime change).
(ii)
Table A-2: Sample Makeup: Control Group 2 (never democratised)
Episodes (all failed) Autocracy
Country ISO Total Years Share Avg Count 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Years Share
obs in ep length in auto
Afghanistan AFG 59 5 8% 5.0 1 2002 54 92%
Angola AGO 39 4 10% 4.0 1 2008 35 90%
Burundi BDI 55 17 31% 5.7 3 1982 1992 1999 38 69%
Bahrain BHR 44 6 14% 3.0 2 1972 2000 38 86%
Central African Republic CAF 64 21 33% 5.3 4 1956 1987 2005 2014 43 67%
Cameroon CMR 52 4 8% 4.0 1 1990 48 92%
DR of Congo COD 64 18 28% 9.0 2 1955 1998 46 72%
Congo COG 64 11 17% 3.7 3 1957 1990 2002 53 83%
Algeria DZA 44 6 14% 2.0 3 1977 1990 1995 38 86%
Egypt EGY 64 10 16% 10.0 1 1956 54 84%
Ethiopia ETH 64 6 9% 6.0 1 1987 58 91%
Gabon GAB 64 13 20% 6.5 2 1957 1987 51 80%
Guinea GIN 64 24 38% 8.0 3 1957 1985 2010 40 63%
Gambia GMB 64 13 20% 3.3 4 1960 1966 1996 2014 51 80%
Guinea-Bissau GNB 64 21 33% 5.3 4 1973 1990 2005 2014 43 67%
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 55 15 27% 7.5 2 1968 1982 40 73%
China, Hong Kong HKG 64 8 13% 8.0 1 1985 56 88%
Haiti HTI 65 12 18% 2.4 5 1951 1987 1991 1993 2006 53 82%
Iraq IRQ 64 8 13% 8.0 1 2004 56 88%
Jordan JOR 64 6 9% 6.0 1 1989 58 91%
Kenya KEN 64 29 45% 9.7 3 1956 1990 2010 35 55%
Kyrgyzstan KGZ 23 11 48% 11.0 1 2003 12 52%
Cambodia KHM 60 11 18% 11.0 1 1990 49 82%
Kuwait KWT 40 16 40% 8.0 2 1981 1991 24 60%
Lao PDR LAO 60 4 7% 4.0 1 1955 56 93%
Lebanon LBN 64 15 23% 15.0 1 1996 49 77%
Libya LBY 62 3 5% 3.0 1 2011 59 95%
Morocco MAR 64 15 23% 7.5 2 1963 1993 49 77%
Myanmar MMR 64 8 13% 8.0 1 2010 56 88%
Mauritania MRT 55 10 18% 3.3 3 1987 2007 2010 45 82%
Malaysia MYS 65 27 42% 13.5 2 1972 1999 38 58%
Oman OMN 57 4 7% 4.0 1 2000 53 93%
Pakistan PAK 64 32 50% 10.7 3 1962 1985 2002 32 50%
Rwanda RWA 55 21 38% 7.0 3 1979 1991 2003 34 62%
Sudan SDN 64 23 36% 7.7 3 1965 1986 1996 41 64%
Singapore SGP 55 1 2% 1.0 1 1960 54 98%
Swaziland SWZ 55 6 11% 6.0 1 1964 49 89%
Seychelles SYC 55 29 53% 9.7 3 1963 1979 1991 26 47%
Syrian Arab Repu SYR 64 5 8% 2.5 2 1953 1961 59 92%
Chad TCD 64 8 13% 8.0 1 1990 56 88%
Uganda UGA 64 16 25% 5.3 3 1953 1981 1989 48 75%
Yemen YEM 52 6 12% 6.0 1 1988 46 88%
Zimbabwe ZWE 64 3 5% 3.0 1 1979 61 95%
Notes: This table provides details on the sample-makeup of the second control group sample, made up of























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B Additional Figures and Tables
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Length of Treatment: Years spent in Democracy (Extract)
Regime Change Effect    Single PCDID PolityIV ERT Double−PCDID ERT Cond. ERT
Significant at 10% level
(b) Zooming in on the first 25 years in Democracy
Notes: These plots presents the results from running line regressions of country-specific coefficients on
the democracy (ERT) dummy, derived from Single and Double PCDID estimates. These are the results
using bias-corrected 90% confidence intervals (via 1,000 bootstrap replications) for inference. Panel (a)
presents the results for all treatment lengths, Panel (b) focuses on fewer than 25 years in democracy.
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Regime Change Effect    Single PCDID 1 Episode 2−5 Episodes Double−PCDID 1 Episode 2−5 Episodes
Significant at 10% level
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Length of Treatment: Years spent in Democracy
Regime Change Effect    Single PCDID 2 Episodes 3−5 Episodes Double−PCDID 2 Episodes 3−5 Episodes
Significant at 10% level
(b) Two vs More Episodes
Notes: These plots present the results from running line regressions of country-specific coefficients on
the democracy dummy, derived from Single and Double PCDID regressions (these are the ’Conditional
ERT’ estimates for the latter). In the upper panel we split the sample into those countries which only
experienced one democratisation episode (N = 25) and those which experienced several (N = 37), in
the lower panel we further split the latter into those with 2 (N = 21) and with 3-5 episodes (N = 16),
respectively. The Double PCDID estimates are still conditioned on the number episodes experienced for
the latter group.
(viii)
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Length of Treatment: Years spent in Democracy (Extract)
Regime Change Effect PolityIV ROW(2) ERT
Significant at 10% level
(b) Zooming in on the first 25 years in Democracy
Notes: The plots present the results from running line regressions of country-specific coefficients on
the democracy (ERT) dummy, derived from Single PCDID regressions which do not include additional
covariates (population growth, export-trade-ratio). These regressions condition on (i) the country series
start year, and (ii) the number of times a country experienced regime change. In Panel (a) we present
the full results, in Panel (b) we focus on the first 25 years of countries in democracy.
(ix)
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Regime Change Effect    Single PCDID PolityIV ERT Double−PCDID ERT Cond. ERT




























0 5 10 15 20 25
Length of Treatment: Years spent in Democracy (Extract)
Regime Change Effect    Single PCDID PolityIV ERT Double−PCDID ERT Cond. ERT
Significant at 10% level
(b) Zooming in on the first 25 years in Democracy
Notes: The plots present the results from running line regressions of country-specific coefficients on
the democracy (ERT) dummy, derived from Double PCDID regressions which do not include additional
covariates (population growth, export/trade ratio). These regressions condition on (i) the country series
start year, and (ii) the number of times a country experienced regime change. In Panel (a) we present
the full results, in Panel (b) we focus on the first 25 years of countries in democracy.
(x)
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Significant at 10% level
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Length of Treatment: Years spent in Democracy
Regime Change Effect    End Year 2014 Alternatives 2010 2005 2000 1995
Significant at 10% level
(b) Reducing the sample: different end years
Notes: The plots present the results from running line regressions of country-specific coefficients on the
democracy (ERT) dummy, derived from Single PCDID estimates. These regressions condition on (i) the
country series start year, and (ii) the number of times a country experienced regime change. In Panel (a)
we vary the start year, in Panel (b) the end year of the full 1950-2014 panel.
(xi)
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Significant at 10% level




























0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Length of Treatment: Years spent in Democracy
Regime Change Effect    End Year 2014 Alternatives 2010 2005 2000 1995
Significant at 10% level
(b) Reducing the sample: different end years
Notes: The plots present the results from running line regressions of country-specific coefficients on
the democracy (ERT) dummy, derived from Double PCDID estimates which account for selection into a
democratic episode and separately into democratic change, on the number of years spent in democracy.
The running line regressions condition on (i) the country series start year, (ii) the number of times a
country experienced regime change, (iii) the country estimate for a democratic episode, (iv) the years
spent in democratic episodes, and (v) the number of democratic episodes. In Panel (a) we vary the start
year, in Panel (b) the end year of the sample. Note that the sample reductions substantially curtail the
treated and control sample sizes. For the start years (‘control 1’ refers to the episodes counterfactual,
‘control 2’ to the regime change counterfactual): 1955 -6% treated, -4% control 1; 1960 -12% treated,
-10% control 2; 1965 -20% treated, -17% control 2; and 1970 -27% treated, -24% control 2. For the end
years: 2010 -7% treated, -9% control 1; 2005 -15% treated, -21% control 1; 2000 -23% treated, -33%
control 1; and 1995 -32% treated, -44% control 1.
(xii)
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Length of Treatment: Years spent in Democracy
Regime Change Effect (Single PCDID)    Full Control Group PolityIV ERT Restricted Control Group ERT
Significant at 10% level
Notes: The plot presents the results from running line regressions of country-specific coefficients on
the democracy dummy, derived from Single PCDID regressions. The yellow line uses the results for an
indicator of a positive polity2 score (PolityIV) — this is included here for comparative purposes. The
orange and blue lines are for the V-Dem ERT regime change dummy but differ in the control group
adopted in the PCDID regressions: the orange line is based on estimates using as control group all those
countries which never experienced regime change (as defined by ERT, N = 58); the blue line is based
on estimates using a sub-sample of countries which never experienced regime change but did experience
episodes of democratisation (N = 43).
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